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Contemporary to Allen’s essay, Alex Wall’s “Program-
ming the Urban Surface” has been equally significant to the 
theoretical development of Landscape Urbanism.05 Here, 
Wall writes that in contemporary urbanization, “infrastruc-
tures and flows of material have become more significant 
than static political and spatial boundaries . . . The emphasis 
shifts here from forms of urban space to processes of urban-
ization.”06 Consequently, he continues, we are now experi-
encing “a fundamental paradigm shift from viewing cities in 
formal terms to looking at them in dynamic ways. Hence, 
familiar urban typologies of square, park, district, and so on 
are of less use or significance than are the infrastructures, 
network flows, ambiguous spaces, and other polymorphous 
conditions that constitute the contemporary metropolis.”07
The paradigms of fluidity, interconnectivity, and process 
promoted by Allen and Wall are echoed in the conception 
of “weak urbanism” formulated by Andrea Branzi. This puta-
tively new condition of urbanism, argues Branzi in the essay 
“A Strong Century,” proceeds according to a hermeneutics 
that is “more ductile and therefore able to absorb the new 
and confront the surprises and complexities that this pro-
duces.”08 The ductile and fluid qualities of Branzi’s model of 
urbanism are further elaborated through his adoption of the 
sociologist Zygmunt Bauman’s concept of a “liquid moder-
nity,” of which he writes, “For Bauman, the term ‘liquid’ pos-
itively indicates the idea of a state of material that does not 
possess its own form (rather, that of its container) and tends 
to follow a temporal flow of transformations. These condi-
tions converge to describe ‘the nature of the current, and in 
many respects, new phase of the history of modernism.’”09
For Charles Waldheim, landscape is the medium 
through which urbanism achieves the kind of connective 
and fluidly interactive performance appropriate to contem-
porary realities. Landscape, as a “performative medium,” 
writes Waldheim in his recent Landscape as Urbanism: A 
General Theory, services the post-Fordist city “through a 
unique combination of ecological performance and design 
culture.”10 “Rather than offering an exception to the struc-
ture of the city,” he continues, landscape “aligns with the 
return to the project of city-making associated with con-
temporary service, creative and culture economies.”11 In this 
fashion, Waldheim argues, landscape succeeds as the disci-
pline of urban design, replacing the now hopelessly retro-
grade and leaden one of architecture. The turn to landscape 
is one in which urbanism is “unburdened of all that architec-
tural baggage.”12
It would be difficult to conceive of anything more 
diametrically opposed to the position of Aureli than this, 
invested as it is in the politics of architectural form as the 
delimited, posed against the connective economies of a 
landscaped urbanism. Rather than pursuing the economic 
Models of fluidity, process, self-organization, and com-
plexity today enjoy near-hegemonic status in the fields of 
architectural, landscape, and urban design. As against the 
putatively top-down practices of planning and the autho-
rial mastery of modernist design, we are led to believe that 
a progressive turn to more bottom-up, networked, ecologi-
cally sensitive, and “new-materialist” principles is under-
way. The advocates of this turn are, however, in thrall to the 
same models as are to be found in the history of neoliberal 
thought and as are frequently employed in the achievement 
of its political and economic agendas.01
The writings of the architect and teacher Pier Vittorio 
Aureli appear to offer a clear and decisive critique of this 
development. Perhaps most appealingly, Aureli’s account 
of the architectural archipelago offers a way for architects 
and architecture to counter the purely economic logic of 
neoliberal processes of urbanization—particularly where 
the urban comes to stand, as with Landscape Urbanism, for 
the purely processual—through the assumption of a politi-
cal project. The field conditions of urbanism as connective 
landscape are countered, by the Italian architectural theorist, 
with the self-sufficient autonomy and formal limits of archi-
tecture as island. 
Aureli’s politics of architectural form are, though, ques-
tionable in their claim to effectively contest the prevalence 
of models of the fluid, connective, and self-organizing in de-
sign, as well as the broader neoliberal conditions in which 
they operate. The inadequacies of Aureli’s archipelago 
model, in these terms, are rooted in its indebtedness to the 
thought of the Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt, with its character-
istically agonistic polarizations of land–sea, political–eco-
nomic, friend–enemy, limited–unlimited, and, especially, in 
its mythic and fascistic origins.
Landscape Urbanism: From Object to Field
That the urban has, in recent years, been transformed from 
a form composed of static architectural objects into a “field” 
of processes, networks, mobility, and infrastructural con-
nectivity constitutes something like a founding principle for 
Landscape Urbanism. In his 1999 essay “Field Conditions,” 
Stan Allen—a significant figure in the formulation and pro-
motion of Landscape Urbanism—located the emergence of 
what he identifies as a generalized shift from “object to field” 
amidst the science, technology, and culture of the post-
World War II period.02 Allen defined this “field condition” 
as one of “loosely bound aggregates characterized by poros-
ity and local interconnectivity  .  .  . bottom-up phenomena, 
defined not by overarching geometrical schemas but by in-
tricate local connections.”03 Employing these insights, Allen 
recommended, would at last place design “in contact with 
the real.”04
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dry land of the European continent—itself clearly divided 
between sovereign national states—and the sea, ostensibly 
belonging to no one but ruled in reality by England: “The 
dry-land order implies the subdivision into state territories. 
The high seas, in turn, are free: they know no state and are 
not subjected to any state or territorial sovereignty.”20 The 
turn to the sea, then, marks a rupture in the existing nomos 
of the earth, its literal deterritorialization. The conquest of 
the sea opens up a new spatial condition in which the old 
practices of land-based sovereignty—the making of clearly 
bounded worlds—are undermined. The sovereign order of 
limits is challenged by new powers that operate through the 
medium of the unlimited. 
In plotting out this dichotomy between the limited and 
the unlimited, played out between land and sea, Schmitt as-
sociates the judicial territory of the land with an established 
order and the unlimited space of the sea with the practice 
of commercial trade. He notes, in Land and Sea, the popu-
larity among the English for maxims such as those of Sir 
Walter Raleigh: “‘Whoever controls the seas controls the 
world trade; whoever controls world trade holds all the trea-
sures of the world in his possession, and in fact, the whole 
world.’”21 “Slogans about freedom, such as ‘All world trade 
is free exchange,’” he writes, “express the zenith of England’s 
maritime and global power.”22 In constructing these polari-
ties and associations—of land and island as the “properly” 
juridical and political space of man, as opposed to the sea as 
the chaotic, desacralized, and unlimited realm of trade and 
commerce—Schmitt is rehearsing themes first established 
in the same ancient world into which he projects the origins 
of the struggles between land and sea powers.
Anaximander and the Apeiron 
The profound significance of monetization for the world of 
ancient Greece, Richard Seaford has argued in his Money and 
the Early Greek Mind: Homer, Philosophy, Tragedy (2004), 
is registered in the cosmology of Anaximander (610–546 
BCE).23 Seaford suggests that Anaximander’s conception 
of the apeiron—the “unlimited,” the primordial, infinite, 
and unendingly productive source from which all things are 
constituted—is inseparable from the development of mon-
etization in the ancient Greek world of the pre-Socratic phi-
losopher, particularly that of the commercial city of Miletus 
in which he lived.24 Just as money serves as a substrate of 
trade, the apeiron serves as the substrate from which all other 
things come into being. Seaford further pursues this analogy 
between “money and everything that we know” in Anaxi-
mander’s conception of the apeiron, noting, for instance, that 
the apeiron and money are each said to “contain all things,” to 
“steer” and regulate all things, to be in constant movement 
and circulation, and to be “undifferentiated, homogeneous.” 
zeitgeist, or drawing upon ontologies of complexity, he has 
proposed to redeem what he regards as a foundational poli-
tics of architectural form through the geopolitical ontology of 
Carl Schmitt.13
Leviathan and Behemoth
In The Nomos of the Earth (1950) and Land and Sea (1954), 
Carl Schmitt argues that a new spatial order has emerged in 
the aftermath of World War II.14 The great sea powers—Eng-
land and the United States—have finally established their 
ascension over the land-based powers of the European con-
tinent. For Schmitt, as he posits in Land and Sea, “world his-
tory” is a struggle between maritime and land or continental 
powers that he casts, in mythological terms, as the battle be-
tween Leviathan and Behemoth, between sea creature and 
land animal:
Behemoth tries to tear Leviathan to pieces with its horns 
and teeth, while in turn, Leviathan tries hard to stop the 
land animal’s mouth and nostrils with its flaps and fins in 
order to deprive it of food and air. This is a graphic illus-
tration . . . of the blockade to which a sea power subjects 
a land power by cutting its supplies in order to starve it 
to death.15 
The defeat of Germany is made to stand more broadly for 
the defeat of the behemoth of Europe by the leviathans of 
England and America. Noting that in some sense, given the 
all-encompassing nature of the oceans, all land for Schmitt is 
effectively an island, this final victory of sea over land brings 
to a conclusion the “spatial revolution” initiated when Eng-
land “turned her collective existence seawards and centred it 
on the sea element.”16 Setting out on this course, transform-
ing itself from “a nation of sheep herders” into one of “pirates” 
in the Elizabethan period, England went on to “win the first 
round of the planetary, spatial revolution.”17 This revolution 
brings about, for the first time in world history, a truly global 
order, with the British Empire at its center. Earlier empires, 
says Schmitt in The Nomos of the Earth, were in some ways 
interconnected, but these “lacked a global character”: “Each 
considered itself to be the world, the cosmos, the house.”18 
Prior to the spatial revolution of modernity there is, then, 
an effective archipelago of more or less isolated worlds, each 
surrounded by the uncharted and “malevolent chaos” of the 
sea.19 With the coming to hegemony of the new maritime 
powers, the plurality of worlds becomes the singular world, a 
truly global condition. 
The ascension of the maritime powers brings to a close 
a centuries-long struggle between land and sea. Over this 
period, from the 16th to the 19th century, the lines of the 
first planetary order are clearly drawn. They run between the 
NG08—Island
120
in terms of fundamental oppositions. These appear in Aris-
totle, as Seaford notes, in terms of a polarization “between 
community and outsider  .  .  . out of which arise the corre-
sponding polarities self-sufficiency–trade, goods– money, 
limit– unlimit, moral– immoral, natural– unnatural.”30 Fol-
lowing Seaford’s reading of Agamemnon, we can add to this 
series land–sea—a polarization between the self-sufficient 
and self-contained limit of the settled territory—the is-
land—and the unsettling commercial space of the unlimited 
sea that surrounds and threatens its order. 
The Discreet Charms of Carl Schmitt
The polarities through which Schmitt’s geopolitical ontology 
are performed are then as much ancient as they are reflec-
tions on his contemporary situation. His arguments, in fact, 
rehearse an archaic tragedy dressed up as the truth of global 
modernity. Following Schmitt, Aureli, in turn, is insistent that 
only clearly bounded, physically and juridically delimited 
spatial orders, such as those of the archipelago, can properly 
sustain the properly political. In adopting Schmitt’s geopo-
litical ontology in this fashion, Aureli revives a definition of 
the political originally confected to underwrite the appropri-
ation of land and the juridical “rights” of this appropriation. 
As the philosopher Bruno Bosteels writes of this ontologiz-
ing work, “Schmitt first of all presupposes an immediate con-
nection between being and spatiality . . . All being is oriented 
in accord with an immanent principle of justice and right: 
‘Right is the rightfulness of being that is given at the origin.’ 
The earth itself, of course, is the primal site for this suturing 
of being, space, and law as right.”31 It is this essentializing and 
archaic foundation of a juridical politics of land appropria-
tion, and its defense, that Aureli takes up as appropriate to 
the question of contemporary processes of urbanization. 
The outside, the unlimited “sea” of urbanism or landscape, 
is abjured as inescapably economic. “One can argue,” writes 
Aureli in The Possibility of an Absolute Architecture (2011), 
“that the notion of urbanization presupposes the fundamen-
tal substitution of politics with economics as a mode of city 
governance to the point that today it is reasonable—almost 
banal—to ask not what kind of political power is governing 
us, but whether we are governed by politics at all.”32 
Aureli’s allegiance to and admiration for what he terms 
Schmitt’s “political realism” determines his definition of the 
political and the strictness with which it is to be understood 
as separate and distinct from the economic.33 Schmitt’s ac-
count of the political, as taken up by Aureli, is heavily reliant 
on the former’s infamous friend–enemy distinction, as pro-
pounded in The Concept of the Political, published in 1932. 
Here Schmitt proclaims that “the specific political distinc-
tion to which political actions and motives can be reduced is 
that between friend and enemy.”34
“The apeiron,” writes Seaford, “is abstract in the sense that (al-
though it surrounds all things and is their source) it is imper-
ceptible. So too money is both concrete and abstract, visible 
and invisible.” Given the extent of these analogies, Seaford 
is lead to posit that the relationship between the apeiron 
and money is more than simply analogical: we are “forced 
to accept [that] Anaximander’s cosmos is in some respect a 
projection of social relations.” His hypothesis is that “one fac-
tor in the genesis of the notion of the apeiron, and of philo-
sophical cosmology in general, was money.”25 Underlying all 
things is the apeiron, and underlying the conception of this 
is monetization, with its abstract, undifferentiated, and im-
personal relations, with its fecund and limitless circulation.
The unleashing of the unsettling effects of monetization 
are played out in what Seaford describes as a “collision be-
tween the unlimit of money and the limit inherent in ritual.” 
The Athenian poet and legislator Solon (a contemporary of 
Anaximander), was the first, notes Seaford, “to believe that 
there is a hidden measure (of intelligence) that holds the lim-
its of all things, and to recommend the principle of modera-
tion.” The notion of limit as figured by Solon in the character 
of Tellos is, argues Seaford, “suggestive of telos, whose basic 
sense of limit or completion qualifies it to refer to ritual.”26 
Likewise in Aristotle’s Politics, he notes, one can locate the 
same concern with a wealth that is measured in terms of 
its adequacy to the “good life,” as opposed to the unlimited 
wealth pursued through the buying and selling of commodi-
ties.27 Ritualized orders of limit and moderation, then, are 
set against the unlimited pursuit of wealth accumulated for 
its own sake in the collision to which Seaford refers. This 
struggle follows, logically enough, from the fact that forms 
of monetized exchange, as Seaford also shows, were devel-
oped out of, and historically succeeded, ritual forms of ex-
change. From ritualized practices of gift-giving, sacrifice, and 
expiation—mediating between men and gods—monetiza-
tion facilitated an abstract circulation of things and values, 
endlessly exchanged, as the impersonal relations mediating 
between men. 
Bringing us more tangibly to the theme of the island and 
the archipelago, Seaford notes that in Aeschylus’s Agamemnon, 
“the sea, as homogenous and unlimited, evokes the homoge-
neity and unlimit of money.”28 As he also remarks, in respect 
of this figuration of the sea as the unlimited, “The (potentially 
alarming and relatively novel) man-made inexhaustibility of 
money is envisaged as in terms of the natural inexhaustibility 
of the sea.”29 To envisage this association between two ex-
pressions of the unlimited would not be difficult, of course, 
for people increasingly engaged in commercial trade routed 
through the waters of the Eastern Mediterranean. 
The impact of monetization in the world of ancient and 
classical Greece is registered, in its tragedy and philosophy, 
Douglas Spencer
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Aureli’s reading of Schmitt attempts to abstract this 
agonistic formulation of what is essentially political from 
its historically specific political context. Indeed, there ap-
pears no reference to Schmitt’s fascism, anti-Semitism, or 
membership in the Nazi party in Aureli’s The Possibility of 
an Absolute Architecture. Schmitt is described here simply 
as a “German jurist.”38 For Aureli, it seems, the fascism of 
Schmitt’s politics can be disregarded while its agonism, and 
its fixation on the appropriation of land, can be repurposed 
as a universal truth in order to pursue a properly political 
architectural project.39 
This project is founded on the formalization of the 
friend–enemy distinction through an architecture with the 
function to clearly inscribe limits and boundaries upon ap-
propriated land. Aureli argues that the formal “essentially 
involves an act of spatial determination, of (de)limitation.”40 
Architecture, as a practice of delimitation, generates the 
inside–outside binary through which the friend can be dis-
tinguished from the enemy. Unlike in Schmitt, however, the 
purpose of this friend–enemy polarization is not to sanction 
war but to allow us to know and identify ourselves, as such, 
through an encounter with what we are not: “What counters 
us inevitably constitutes the knowledge of our own limit, our 
For Schmitt the political just is, ontologically, the ineluc-
table struggle between friend and enemy. This struggle marks 
the perpetual agonism that must exist between sovereign na-
tion states in order that the political exists as such. The neces-
sary and defining expression of this agonism is war: “A world 
in which the possibility of war is utterly eliminated,” writes 
Schmitt, “a completely pacified globe, would be a world with-
out the distinction of friend and enemy and hence a world 
without politics.”35 As opposed to liberal notions of compe-
tition that might derive from matters of trade, the properly 
political is dependent on the possibility of armed conflict be-
tween sovereign spatial orders. “The friend, enemy, and com-
bat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because 
they refer to the real possibility of physical killing,” Schmitt 
makes plain in The Concept of the Political.36 As is well known, 
Schmitt’s theories of sovereignty and the political were in-
strumental to the juridical formulations of National Social-
ism, particularly during the period of his membership in the 
Nazi Party. As international relations scholar Benno Gerhard 
Teschke notes, Schmitt’s theory of the political “inscribed 
Hitler’s ‘spatial revolution’ into a full-scale reinterpretation 
of Europe’s geopolitical history, grounded in land appropria-
tions, which legitimized Nazi Germany’s wars of conquest.”37 
Andrea Branzi, Metropoli Merceologica, 2010.
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It is this same possibility for a radically autonomous 
form of life in common that Aureli also locates in the case 
of “Red Vienna” and the “Hof ” superblocks built there in 
the mid-1930s to accommodate the city’s workers. These su-
perblocks collectively constitute a further historical instance 
of the archipelago. They are situated “within the city as self-
sufficient islands in pronounced contrast to their surround-
ings . . . an archipelago of places for communitarian life.”49
The Agonies of the Archipelago
As a politics of architecture, Aureli’s archipelago is pitched 
against the economics of urbanism; the island against the 
sea, the limited against the apeiron. The decisiveness with 
which the political is opposed to the economic derives from 
the equally decisive function of architecture as, essentially 
and fundamentally, a practice of formal delimitation. This 
notion of what is essential and fundamental to architec-
ture derives, in turn, from the Schmittian conception of the 
nomos, a word that comes, states Schmitt, from nemein, “a 
[Greek] word that means both ‘to divide’ and ‘to pasture.’ 
Thus, nomos is the immediate form in which the political and 
social order of a people becomes spatially visible.” Elaborat-
ing on the meaning of the nomos he continues that it can be 
“described as a wall, because, like a wall, it, too, is based on 
sacred orientations.”50 The decisive presence of the nomos as 
wall constitutes the foundational act of spatial ordering. It 
divides inside from outside, friend from enemy.
It is this decisiveness that no doubt endows what Au-
reli refers to as his “project” with its significant appeal for 
own form.”41 “The enemy,” argues Aureli in a quasi-Brechtian 
formulation, “estranges us from our familiar self-perception, 
and gives us back the sharp contour of our own figure.”42 
Since form requires delimitation, architecture, as a formal 
practice of inscribing limits, achieves a political condition 
only when it is a “composition of parts” and never when it in-
tegrates us into the whole of the limitless “sea.” In the “com-
position of parts,” writes Aureli, “the concept of the formal 
and the concept of the political coincide and can be posited 
against notions such as urban space, urban landscape, and 
network.”43 Integration with the apeiron of urbanism would 
result in the dissolution of the political and the architectural 
alike, within a purely economic logic.44 This dissolution can 
only be resisted through what Aureli names as the “meta-
form of the archipelago.”45
In The Possibility of an Absolute Architecture, Aureli af-
firms the architectural archipelago as an essentially political 
form through an account of its periodic historical appear-
ances. This account ranges across the works of figures such as 
Andrea Palladio, Giovanni Battista Piranesi, Étienne-Louis 
Boullée, Ludwig Hilberseimer, Oswald Mathias Ungers, 
and Rem Koolhaas. He praises Koolhaas and Elia Zenghe-
lis’s project (as OMA) Exodus, or the Voluntary Prisoners 
of Architecture, for instance, for its projection of “an exac-
erbated version of communitarian citizenship based on 
self-imposed closure.”46 In the work of Ungers, Aureli finds 
a fully developed “theory of the city as an archipelago.”47 
Ungers, especially in the 1977 project for the shrinking city 
of Berlin, The City within the City—Berlin as Green Archi-
pelago, produces what Aureli understands to be a politically 
radical project in its refusal of the megastructural form of 
architecture prevalent in this period. The megastructure is 
held to integrate architecture with processes of urbanization, 
dissolving the possibility of the truly political architecture of 
the limited enclosure; Ungers’s project, in contrast, is “com-
posed of islands, each of which was conceived as a formally 
distinct micro-city.”
Aureli also notes the significance of Ungers’s earlier re-
search, undertaken with his wife Liselotte, on the history 
of communitarian (typically Shaker or Anabaptist) settle-
ments in America: 
Religious communities such as the Shakers were charac-
terized by a principle of communal life in which there was 
no private property; all facilities were for collective use. 
This resulted in settlements whose form was organized 
for communal life, with an abundance of common spaces, 
and in clear contrast to cities, which are shaped by land 
ownership. Ungers observed that radical communality 
was possible only within limited settlements.48
Dogma, A Field of Walls: Project on Giovanni Battista Piranesi's 
Campo Marzio dell'Antica Roma, 2012.
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It might also be noted that gated communities and securi-
tized apartment blocks, with facilities shared in common, 
are very much the preferred form of dwelling for the urban 
rich and super-rich wanting to insulate themselves from the 
chaos of their immediate surroundings. An archipelago of 
secured enclaves increasingly defines patterns of urban de-
velopment. The occupants of these are, precisely, enabled 
through the decisiveness of walls and boundaries to estab-
lish their identities in contradistinction to those of the urban 
masses that surround them. The formal identity between the 
archipelago and the political agonism of the friend–enemy 
distinction appears to work then, but to what end?
Aureli’s project appears to challenge the essentially 
neoliberal turn of contemporary urbanization, as well as 
the models and practices with which architectural, land-
scape, and urban design have tended to serve it of late. This 
challenge is, however, in its very definition of the political, 
absolutely compromised by its Schmittian origins—mytho-
poetical, archaic, and formalist—at its core. In discount-
ing the possibility that the unlimited—the urban—might 
itself be a space simultaneously and complexly economic 
and political, this project effectively concedes the greater 
part of the territory to the putative enemy. It offers only the 
possibility of secession from the networks of globalized ur-
banization that are always already deemed nonpolitical. In 
doing so, Aureli’s politics of form misses what is effectively 
political in the making fluid, connective, and productive of 
the urban, especially under the contemporary imperatives 
of neoliberalism. 
Marx and Engels, of course, already understood the pro-
cess of urbanization and its economic modes of production 
in explicitly political terms. This process is understood, dia-
lectically, as the ground of any future universal struggle—
antagonistic rather than agonistic—against capital, in their 
Communist Manifesto. Many figures within Western Marx-
ism, perhaps most notably Henri Lefebvre, have since taken 
up and developed their analysis in attempting to understand 
the politics of urbanization in the late 20th and early 21st 
centuries. From a different perspective, but equally con-
cerned with the political, Foucault’s concept of the “biopo-
litical” understands the production of subjectivity, especially 
that occurring within neoliberalism, as a political operation 
achieved through economic means.54
In addition to the politics of urbanization, there is also 
a politics of design that is effectively obscured by Aureli’s 
position. By the logic of Schmitt’s definition of the political, 
design that is not concerned with the decisive production of 
limits and boundaries is not political. The production and ar-
ticulation of networks, the channeling of subjects according 
to preferred patterns of movement and association, in fact 
the very act of dismantling limits and boundaries is, though, 
those seeking to challenge the hegemony of the various 
ecoarchitectures and parametricisms, all the relational, in-
frastructural, and landscape urbanisms, and their relentless 
reassertions of the fluid, flexible, and self-organizing. To 
these, “the project” offers a clear and concise set of formu-
lations that appear readily translatable into design thinking 
and practice. Less often reflected upon, however, are the 
implications of the politics of agonism on which the archi-
pelago model is premised.
It is seldom noted, for instance, that the political ago-
nism adopted by Aureli is essentially opposed to the possi-
bility of any radical transformation of the social in its totality. 
The politics of agonism is, by definition, opposed to any 
form of universalism or internationalism on which any such 
transformation would depend. It cannot countenance the 
termination of the friend-enemy distinction, or any move-
ment toward this possibility as a political goal. There must 
be an ineluctable and untranscendable condition of conflict. 
For Aureli this is essential to our identity, but it forecloses 
the possibility of identities that are formed not through the 
appropriation, settlement, and delimitation of land but on 
relations of solidarity despite of, and across, boundaries, 
borders, and walls. As the philosopher Mark Neocleous 
writes, “For Schmitt the vision of a world without the state, 
without the political friend-enemy distinction and without 
war is an absurd and impossible dream. It is also of course 
a communist, but not a fascist one.”51 While for Aureli the 
promise of agonism is clearly reoriented to an entirely dif-
ferent agenda from that of Schmitt, the impossibility of even 
moving toward the overcoming of conflict is, for him, un-
viable: the overcoming of conflict would annul the political 
dimension itself (as it is understood here). There can be no 
dialectical movement of synthesis.52 But if this is supposed, 
somehow, to forestall the universalizing managerialism of 
life, it serves equally to delegitimize any equally universal-
izing opposition to this prospect. There can only be parts—
separate, distinct, and opposed to one another. 
In its essentializing tendencies, the formalism through 
which the identities between the political, the architectural, 
and the communal are forged is equally problematic. There 
are no guarantees that small-scale, architecturally delimited 
settlements will produce or sustain forms of commonality 
with any even vaguely radical or progressive orientation. As 
the cultural historian Fred Turner, amongst others, has made 
plain, the communes of America’s West Coast countercul-
ture of the 1960s and 1970s, for instance, were largely orga-
nized and populated by affluent white men. The organization 
of these communes tended to exacerbate patriarchal preju-
dices, sustain class distinctions, and produce friend–enemy 
distinctions of the most racist sort between the communal-
ists and the marginalized ethnic groups they encountered.53 
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a political practice. It is the politics of this practice—and 
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a monastic politics of retreat that—while now perhaps de-
sirable to some—is evidently attainable only by the most 
economically privileged.55 A more ambitious politics would 
be ready to engage in the no doubt more fraught struggle to 
understand, and act upon, the spaces of the unlimited as a 
radically universalizing and collective project.
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